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ImprInt
Summary
The following report presents the outline of the new research program of the Peace Research Insti-
tute Frankfurt (PRIF). Starting in 2018 and with a duration of at least five years, this program provides 
the framework for a significant part of the academic research that will be conducted at the institute.
The overall aim of the research program “Coercion and Peace” is to investigate whether and in 
what way different types of coercion that aim at enforcing norms and political order succeed, and how 
this affects peace at the international and intrastate level. More specifically, key research questions 
that will be studied in the new research program include:
 – What forms and configurations of coercion actually contribute to enforcing or maintaining 
peace?
 – How and to what extent is coercion legitimized and institutionally limited in order to fulfill this 
role? 
 – When and under what conditions does coercion become illegitimate, provoke (violent) resis-
tance and/or endanger peace? 
 – What alternatives to coercion exist that give an idea of how a non-coercive yet peaceful order 
might look like?
In addressing these questions, PRIF aims at furthering understanding of the ambivalent rela-
tionship between coercion and peace with the ultimate goal of contributing to the establishment of 
peaceful orders that are as non-coercive as possible. Doing so is obviously not only of academic rele-
vance. As the present report argues, the current accumulation of crises that are seriously challenging 
the liberal, rule-based world order – both in its actual form and, even more strongly, its promise – can 
be understood as resulting from both too little and too much coercion at the same time. Studying 
the complex ways in which coercion and peace relate to each other thus also promises to shed light 
on the current plight of the international order and its consequences for international and intrastate 
conflict.
Research programs are like living organisms. They evolve with the discussions and investiga-
tions they give rise to. The following outline, therefore, is not carved in stone. Nonetheless, it formu-
lates overarching questions, crucial conceptual clarifications, and important analytical distinctions. 
In addition, it identifies research gaps and research topics, which will guide the development and 
implementation of academic studies that seek to shed light on the ambivalent relationship between 
coercion and peace.
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1. IntroduCtIon1
Until very recently, the multilateral order as established since the end of World War II was predom-
inantly regarded as sufficient for containing violence and allowing the establishment of peaceful 
relations between states. The assumption, which became the dominant one in both academic and 
political debates at least with the end of the Cold War, was that the world was set on a path of 
ever increasingly complex interdependencies (“globalization”), which were, inter alia, giving rise to 
a progressively denser web of international and transnational institutions aimed at providing global 
public goods (“global governance”). As a result, or so the expectation, persisting conflicts in the in-
ternational system would become civilized and enclosed. While the predominant view on this emerg-
ing structure of global governance emphasized its non-hierarchical nature (see Dingwerth/Pattberg 
2006; Rosenau/Czempiel 1992), scholars also noted that international organizations and regimes 
were invested with increasing authority (see Lake 2010, 2013; Zürn et al. 2012). With regard to proce-
dures, international organizations developed capacities for monitoring and enforcing norm compli-
ance, as exemplified by the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization. In terms 
of substance, international norms were seen as increasingly binding states to commitments in terms 
of both individual (human) rights – as in the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to 
Protect – and common global responsibilities – as with international climate policy and the ever-ex-
panding global development agenda. 
Current events place this narrative in question: The liberal, rule-based order is in serious crisis. Of 
course, this order was never as liberal or rule-based as its proponents argued. And even in the heyday 
of the decade following the demise of the Soviet Union it was far from uncontested. However, these 
days it may be facing a new quality of crisis. Challenges to the global order are no longer merely 
voiced from the margins, and not “only” constituted by the rise of non-Western powers such as China. 
Today, it is key Western players and former supporters of the liberal, international order that openly 
voice fundamental dissent with multilateral organizations and established international norms. In the 
case of the United States, which has long had an ambivalent relationship to multilateral institutions, 
president Donald Trump appears to be adopting decidedly unilateralist policies that, more than ever, 
ignore commitments made by previous governments. As indicated by the criticism of NATO and by 
the Trump administration’s position vis-á-vis free trade agreements, this challenge even concerns 
strategic US commitments that have characterized US world order policies since the end of World 
War II. In Europe, too, established multilateral institutions have come under serious pressure. The UK 
decided to leave the European Union, and nationalist movements that reject the European integration 
project are on the rise throughout the region. In some Eastern European countries they have already 
achieved power. These developments in Europe and the US are part of a broader trend that is dis-
cussed as a worldwide “democratic recession” (Diamond 2015; Plattner 2017). At the international 
level this is reflected in the fact that, across all regions of the world, an increasing number of gov-
ernments is (once again) openly defending national sovereignty against international commitments, 
1  The drafting of a research program is a collective process to which the entire staff of the Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt (PRIF) has contributed in one way or another. In addition, comments and suggestions by the members of 
PRIF’s Scientific Advisory Board were vital in the process of clarifying our thoughts and sharpening our focus.
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in general, and the spread of liberal norms, in particular. In recent years, for instance, three African 
states decided – at least temporarily – to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, a decision 
that was explicitly endorsed by the African Union, and, in 2017, Venezuela initiated the process of 
leaving the Organization of American States. At the same time, existing international organizations 
seem rather ineffective in dealing with contemporary challenges, whether it is the European Union in 
the case of the persisting financial crisis in the Euro zone, the United Nations when it comes to the 
internationalized civil war in Syria, or existing arms control regimes in the face of new dynamics of 
armament and proliferation.
While each of these individual challenges is contributing to national, regional or global instability 
and thus endangering peace at the international or intrastate level, there seems to be an overarching 
theme, an inherent ambivalence characterizing the current situation: In a nutshell, the current accu-
mulation of crises seems to be the result of both too little and too much coercion at the same time. 
With its new research program, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) will shed light on the 
current plight of the international order and its consequences for international and intrastate conflict 
by scrutinizing this ambivalence of coercion, focusing in particular on the relationship between co-
ercion and peace. 
On the one hand, the current state of affairs is the result of a deficit of coercion in international 
peace and security policy, as the lack of commitment to norms and the absence of measures for en-
forcing them demonstrate. The stalemate in the UN Security Council hinders any joint action in the 
case of Syria. The failure to effectively prevent the Syrian government from using chemical weapons 
has led many observers to applaud US unilateral air strikes as an adequate reaction to the breach 
of the chemical weapons ban by Syria, although these strikes were not sanctioned by international 
law. The European “refugee crisis” became a crisis because the EU proved unable to collectively deal 
with the increasing inflow of refugees and migrants. This state of affair has led to renewed interest 
in the question of coercion, most notably in the area of (US) security studies (Greenhill/Krause 2018; 
Lindsay/Gartzke 2016; Rabkin/Yoo 2014). In the opening chapter to a forthcoming edited volume 
aptly entitled Coercion. The Power to Hurt in International Politics, Art and Greenhill (2018: 4) observe 
an increasing scholarly interest in the ways in which “coercion works when using tools other than (or 
in addition to) traditional military force and by actors other than the [US]” (see also Lindsay/Gartzke 
2016). From a different perspective, Jane Mansbridge (2015) has argued that in an increasingly inter-
dependent world we need more coercion in order to guarantee the provision of public goods such as 
peace, security and wellbeing.
On the other hand, however, it is exactly the prevalence of coercion in the multilateral order that 
has contributed to the emergence of the current crisis. This prevalence of coercion includes, but is 
not limited to, the unilateral use of coercive tools. It is, for instance, the EU’s power to enforce reg-
ulations in many policy fields that makes many Europeans so skeptical of the organization. The in-
ternational promotion of democracy and human rights and so-called humanitarian interventions are 
often resisted because they are perceived as instances of illegitimate coercive interference that vio-
late the sovereignty of states and societies’ right to self-determination. In the case of Syria, negative 
experiences with the Western strategy of coercive regime change in Libya hardened the resistance 
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among many non-Western states to approving even non-military sanctions against the Syrian regime. 
Asymmetric arms control regimes have incited criticism of the control of the technology “haves” over 
the “have-nots,” limiting the opportunities for development of the latter. International financial institu-
tions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, are perceived as all-powerful and 
deeply unjust in their application of conditionality in target societies. Generally speaking, ever since 
colonization, the Global South has been subjected to “systemic dominance structures” (Wendt/Bar-
nett 1993). And until today, the dramatic inequalities both between and within states are sustained 
at least in part by coercion, ranging from direct forms of military intervention, economic threats or 
political repression to what Karl Marx (1976: 899) once called “[t]he silent compulsion of economic 
relations” (see Anderson 2015; Valentini 2011). To the extent that contemporary resistance to the lib-
eral, rule-based order stems from the very internal contradictions of this order, including its coercive 
features, the calls for “more coercion” cited above hardly offer a convincing solution. They will be 
either unrealistic (when it comes to increasing the collective capacity to enforce international norms 
and commitments) or counterproductive (when it comes to coercion by individual states or “coali-
tions of the willing”). In general, this reading instead suggests a critical perspective on “the coercive 
capacities [that are] essential to the construction and maintenance of international and local orders” 
(Barkawi 2015: 56). 
Traditional theoretical debates in International Relations (IR) reflect this ambivalence of coercion. 
IR scholars have long problematized coercion or rather the lack thereof. Going back to Hobbes, real-
ist and liberal institutionalist theories assume that the absence of coercion in international politics is 
the reason for recurring conflict. The key difference here is with the emergence of modern national 
states, in which the accumulation and concentration of coercive means in the hands of states have 
been accompanied by a relative pacification of intra-societal relations (Tilly 1990). At the internation-
al level, as long as there is no superior coercive power that is able to authoritatively solve conflicts 
among states, states have to take care of their security on their own. The result is a security dilemma 
in which all states are forced to arm themselves in order to deter potential aggressors, rendering 
them even more insecure than before (Herz 1974: 39). In the straightforward terms of Waltz (1979: 
102): “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so.” This 
argument also informs neoliberal cooperation theories which emphasize the necessity of coercive 
mechanisms to ensure compliance with cooperative agreements (for instance Downs et al. 1996; 
Fearon 1998). 
On the other hand, critical theories and normative theories of peace stipulate that it is the prev-
alence of coercion that undermines or endangers peace. Here, peace means the absence not only 
of interstate war and manifest violence, but also the absence of “structural violence” (Galtung 1969), 
the “freedom from want” (Picht 1971), or at least a process of declining violence and increasing jus-
tice (Czempiel 1998). In this understanding, peace is realized by progressively renouncing violence, 
replacing coercion by cooperation and consent, and implementing human rights, individual freedom 
and global justice. In a similar way, in current IR debates, international authority is ideal-typically de-
fined as a state of affairs in which coercion is not, or is no longer, needed (Lake 2013: 56–57; Zürn et 
al. 2012: 86; see also Hurd 1999).
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We are thus confronted with two nearly opposite assumptions regarding the relationship between 
coercion and peace. While one side values coercion as a necessary means for maintaining or achiev-
ing peace, the other suggests eliminating coercion to allow peace. Looking at these two positions 
more closely, it is apparent that both have a ring of truth to them but both also raise more questions 
than they answer. On the one hand, as long as peace is not reduced to the absence of physical vio-
lence but includes a “positive” dimension in terms of procedural legitimation, social justice or individ-
ual autonomy, coercion will never coexist easily with peace. At the very least, the presence of coer-
cion does, therefore, harm the quality of the peace it achieves. Yet, peace often does not come about 
of its own accord, but has to be brokered and, not unusually, actually imposed. Even scholars of non-
violent resistance, such as Gene Sharp (2010: 36), defend strategies of “nonviolent coercion” in order 
to enforce regime change upon unwilling dictators. What is more, even when peace is established, it 
has to be secured and defended against hostile forces by coercive means. Thus, coercion is also an 
integral element of a peaceful order, as classical political sociology and realist IR theories maintain.2
The question then arises, when and under what conditions either side is right: Too little coercion 
might endanger peace by failing to ensure compliance with basic norms and institutions designed to 
ensure the autonomy of individuals, and it might fail to bring about peace by being unable to disarm 
opponents. Too much coercion in turn can cause resistance by depriving individuals of their basic 
rights, and, in settings where it is perceived as illegitimate, it can even provoke violence. Thus, there 
is an inherent tension between coercion and peace that the two positions have not yet adequately ad-
dressed. PRIF’s new research program Coercion and Peace is designed to do exactly this: to analyze 
how to achieve as much peace as possible with as little coercion as necessary. Taking into account 
the fact that this is certainly not a simply quantitative question of more or less coercion, the overall 
aim of the new research program is to investigate whether and in what way different types of coercion 
that aim at enforcing norms and political order succeed, and how this affects peace at the international 
and intrastate level.
To do this, we will focus on the concept of coercion and not, as has mostly been the case until 
now, on those of force or violence. As the discussion in this introduction has already shown, and as 
will be further elaborated in the following sections, the use of force or physical violence is only one 
mechanism through which individuals and collectives may be coerced into complying with a given 
political order. Key areas of study in the new research program will therefore include:
 – What forms and configurations of coercion actually contribute to enforcing or maintaining 
peace?
 – How and to what extent is coercion legitimized and institutionally limited in order to fulfill this 
role? 
 – When and under what conditions does coercion become illegitimate, provoke (violent) resis-
tance and/or endanger peace? 
 – Which alternatives to coercion exist that may point towards the ideal of a non-coercive and yet 
peaceful order?
2  In Gramscian terminology, the argument is that even if hegemony allows the coercive element of the capitalist state 
to take a backseat it remains “protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971: 263).
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In the following section, we start out by clarifying our key concepts (2.), before we sketch out ex-
isting research on coercion and outline the innovative potential of the research program envisaged 
(3.). Following this, we propose an analytic heuristic (4.), on the basis of which we highlight key re-
search topics and preliminary lines of research (5.).
2. ConCeptual ClarIfICatIonS
The concepts “coercion” and “peace” are located in a complex semantic field to which other contest-
ed concepts such as power, domination, violence, war, and sanctions belong. The more broadly those 
concepts are defined, i.e., the more strongly “conceptual stretching” occurs (see Sartori 1970; Collier/
Mahon 1993), the greater are their overlaps and ambiguities. For this reason, it is necessary to state 
the core concepts of the research program with sufficient precision so that they offer a conceptual 
framework within which various research questions can be examined and reasonable political and 
normative conclusions drawn.
2.1 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF COERCION
Coercion is often – in a narrow sense – understood as external influence on an actor, by means of the 
threat or actual use of force, in order to bring about behavior that would not otherwise occur (Schell-
ing 1966; Ellsberg 1975; Freedman 1998; Byman/Waxman 2002). The concept of coercion focused 
on the use of violence as a means of applying pressure is, however, too narrow if the everyday use of 
the concept and the variability of social practice is kept in mind. In fact, even IR scholars who focus 
on coercion through (threats of) military force normally acknowledge that coercion can also include 
purely non-military means such as economic sanctions (Art 2003: 7; see also Art/Greenhill 2018: 14; 
George 1991: 4–6). But non-military forms of coercion with which actors can be forced to do some-
thing they would not otherwise do go beyond economic sanctions. They can also involve (threats of) 
psychological pressure, shaming and blaming, or the exclusion from participation in political/interna-
tional institutions. In this sense, coercion reflects a continuum along which various types of costs are 
imposed or threatened in order to compel a particular behavior.3
Robert Nozick was the first to establish a conceptual framework for investigating coercion in 
terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions (Nozick 1969).4 Almost all conceptual-philosophical 
debates on coercion, for instance about whether coercion necessarily implies physical force, wheth-
er merely threatening or actually applying force constitutes coercion, or whether coercion occurs 
3  In this understanding, “der zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments” (“the unforced force of the better argument”), 
which Jürgen Habermas (1981) made the core of his theory of communicative action, according to which norms and 
decisions are based on the uncoerced agreement of everybody involved in a discourse, does not constitute coercion. 
The paradoxical formulation already makes clear that such a process of communicative persuasion is less a matter 
of a negative external effect than of an internal process of voluntarily accepting the better argument.
4  Person P coerces Q into not doing (refraining from doing) act A if and only if: (1) P (the coercer) threatens to bring 
about some consequence if Q (the coerced) does A; Q understands this threat; (2) Action A, as a result of the threat-
ened consequence, is made substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A “without” the threatened 
consequences; (3) P’s threat is credible; (4) Q does not do A; (5) At least part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to avoid 
the consequence that P has threatened to bring about (based on Nozick 1969: 441–445).
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only when the person placed under pressure gives in or already occurs when the coercive individual 
makes demands, derive from Nozick’s work.5 As a result, an understanding of coercion has devel-
oped which defines it as intentional interference in the right to self-determination of an actor by 
threatening that costs will be incurred if the actor is not willing to make desired changes in behavior 
(see Anderson 2015).
Yet, as the remark by Karl Marx about the “[t]he silent compulsion of economic relations” cited 
above already suggests, coercion cannot be reduced to directly observable events in which identifi-
able agents coerce others (see Shapiro/Wendt 1992: 206–208). As approaches involving “structural 
coercion” have emphasized, social relationships and social structures also force people into doing 
things they would not otherwise do (see Ball 1978; Reiman 2012). In a similar way, in the context of 
contemporary debates on global justice, Laura Valentini (2011) has distinguished between an “inter-
actional” and a “systemic” type of coercion, arguing that not only powerful agents, but also systems 
of formal and/or informal rules can have coercive effects on agents’ freedom.
Against this background, we define coercion as the threat and/or the actual imposition of costs on 
an actor that is directed towards eliminating this actor’s freedom of action with regard to a specific set 
of actions. This implies, among other things:
 – Both actors and structures can coerce. The common element of interactional and systemic 
types of coercion is that both tend to eliminate an actor’s freedom of action in a targeted way. 
 – Coercion is not about generally reducing an actor’s freedom of action or autonomy, but involves 
its targeted elimination with a view to a specific act or set of actions. Such a targeted elimina-
tion can be “positive” in the sense that all options but one are eliminated (the actor is compelled 
to take one specific action), or “negative” in the sense that one option is eliminated (the actor is 
deterred from taking one specific action).6
 – Coercion is non-arbitrary in the sense that it either reflects the intentions of a coercing actor7 or 
the systematic features of a coercive structure.8
 – Coercion, as an attempt or a tendency to force an actor (or several actors) into doing something, 
can fail.9 An actor’s freedom of action is never entirely eliminated.10
5   See however Anderson (2010), who distinguishes between Nozick’s approach to coercion, which he calls the “pres-
sure approach,” and an alternative view, which he calls the “enforcement approach.”
6   The distinction between compellence and deterrence has been introduced by Schelling (1966, see below).
7   Intentionality in interactional coercion, normally implies that the coercer aims at forcing the coerced to do (or refrain 
from doing) a specific act. Yet, generally speaking, coercion can also result as an unintended side-effect of an action 
that aims at something else. As long as the action that produces the coercive effect – that is, the action that tends 
to eliminate another actor’s freedom of action – is intentional, we would still consider it a type of (indirect) coercion.
8   In Valentini’s definition of systemic coercion, the constraining effects of systems of rule on agents’ freedom have to 
be foreseeable, avoidable and non-trivial in order to be considered coercive (Valentini 2011: 137).
9   In this regard, we depart from Nozick’s assumption that coercion must necessarily be successful.
10   As Giddens (1984: 175) has noted, even the threat of death leaves the threatened actor the option of accepting to 
die. And when the coerced is dead, coercion is obviously no longer possible. In this sense, also, Art and Greenhill 
(2018: 15) distinguish successful (wartime) coercion from victory (in terms of total defeat of the enemy): In cases of 
successful coercion, it is still the coerced actor who decides to act (even if there are virtually no alternative options 
available).
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 – Coercion can operate though both the threat and the actual imposition of costs.11
 – Coercion can be violent or non-violent, as physical force is only one way of limiting the freedom 
of others.
Coercion can have different degrees of (il-)legitimacy according to whether it is applied through pro-
cedures that are generally acknowledged (by the coerced actor, too), is exercised by acknowledged 
authorities and/or is aimed at achieving generally accepted goals.
2.2 COERCION, POWER AND LEGITIMACY
The concept of coercion, as defined above, is closely related to the concept of power. In fact, Robert 
Dahl’s famous definition – “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that 
B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl 1957: 202–203) – is fairly close to Nozick’s conceptualization of 
coercion, with the exception that power refers to the potential to shape the behavior of another ac-
tor, while coercion connotes the actual exercise of power. Still, in contemporary academic debates, 
power is usually understood in broader terms. In these debates coercive or compulsory power is 
mostly regarded as a subtype of power which is characterized by a direct relationship of control be-
tween actors (see Barnett/Duvall 2005; Lukes 2005).12 Our usage of coercion is both more specific 
and broader. It is more specific because, in terms of our definition, not every exercise of direct power 
over another actor involves coercion, but only if it aims at eliminating the other actor’s freedom. While 
(threats of) costs or deprivation are never prohibitive in a strict sense, coercion implies the attempt 
to leave no other option to the coerced. At the same time, our concept is broader than, for exam-
ple, Barnett and Duvall’s notion of compulsory power, because we not only include coercion that is 
exercised by identifiable actors but also structural or systemic forms of coercion. The key criterion 
is, then, the significance of the (assumed or perceived) consequences for the actor who is to be co-
erced (Anderson 2015; Valentini 2011), no matter whether these consequences involve overwhelming 
physical violence, unbearable economic costs or an unacceptable loss in reputation, and no matter 
whether these consequences are produced by a specific actor or arise from existing social structures 
and institutions.
Another debate concerns the purposes of the actors who make use of coercion and the relationship 
between coercer and coerced. In the context of this research program, we are interested in coercion 
that constraints actors’ freedom of political action, broadly conceived. Coercion, then, involves an 
attempt at political steering or control as well as a claim to rule, authority or domination (Herrschaft, 
in Max Weber’s terminology). The claim to, or manifestation of Herrschaft immediately raises the 
question of the justification and legitimacy of coercion. Given that it directly infringes upon actors’ 
freedom of political action, coercion necessarily creates a need for justification (see Nardin 2005; 
11   As in Nozick’s definition, usually the coercer him/herself is seen to also be the one threatening or actually impos-
ing costs on the coerced. Yet, interactional coercion can also involve more than two agents. In “indirect coercion”, 
a coercer P coerces Q into doing (or refraining from doing) A by promising to shield Q from the costs threatened or 
imposed by a third actor X (see Emanuelson/Willer 2015: 3).
12   Barnett and Duvall (2005: 42), for instance, define power broadly as “the production, in and through social relations, 
of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate,” a definition that explicitly 
also encompasses diffuse and constitutive types of power.
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Valentini 2011). Furthermore, in line with Weber (1968), we can assume that coercion – if it is to be 
considered a legitimate exercise of authority – requires an institutionalized setting that establishes a 
system of enforcement with legally sanctioned practices of coercion.13 However, a certain degree of 
unjustified or unjustifiable coercion always remains. Political rule (Herrschaft) never simply becomes 
authority – it can never be based solely on consensual agreement and voluntary compliance, but 
always contains an element of rule enforcement, or domination.14 Such “nonconsensual” processes 
are precisely where coercion enters the picture, which can therefore never be fully legitimate, as Jane 
Mansbridge (1997) has argued. Thus, coercion is intimately related to, and regularly provokes, resis-
tance (Mansbridge 2015).
These remarks on legitimacy, justification and resistance suggest that the ways in which coercion is 
perceived by the coerced is a key issue when it comes to understanding the relationship between co-
ercion and peace. From the perspective of the coerced, an act or relationship of coercion is problem-
atic to the extent that he/she claims the kind of freedom of political action that is negatively counter-
acted by the coercer. Bridging our new research program on Coercion and Peace and its predecessor 
Just Peace Governance, we can thus argue that it is the gap between the perceived entitlement to 
freedom of political action on the part of the coerced and the denial of such freedom by the coercer 
that makes coercion normatively problematic and shapes its empirical (il-)legitimacy and effects in a 
given context.15 Empirically, however, this perceived entitlement to freedom of political action is not 
a constant, but varies in space and time: States differ in their emphasis on sovereignty and non-in-
terference; individuals in different societal contexts hold different notions of personal autonomy; 
and political communities claim varying degrees of collective self-determination. The same act or 
relationship of coercion, therefore, means different things to different collective or individual actors 
– and these varying meanings will plausibly shape the legitimacy and the effects of coercion. This 
suggests an additional analytical perspective that studies coercion through the lenses of ideational 
frames that invest the respective acts of coercion with (culture-)specific narratives, which in turn in-
teract between groups at the international, transnational, national and local level.
2.3 COERCION AND PEACE
When investigating whether and in what way different types of coercion that aim at enforcing norms 
succeed, and how this affects peace, a great deal also depends upon the concept of peace. Peace 
research generally distinguishes a static conception, according to which peace is a state of non-vio-
lent coexistence of formally constituted actors, and a dynamic conception, according to which peace 
is understood as a process of decreasing violence and increasing social justice (see Czempiel 1998, 
2006; Brock 2002). A narrow concept of peace, as it is understood from pacifist positions, but also 
13   In this sense, Jane Mansbridge (1997: 407–408) distinguishes between “raw” and “legitimate” coercion (but later 
adds that coercion can never be fully legitimate, see below).
14   See the controversy in the Journal of the German Association for Political Science (PVS): Daase/Deitelhoff 2015; 
Zürn 2015.
15   A key concern of PRIF’s previous research program Just Peace Governance was to study the role of (diverging) con-
ceptions of justice and related claims to perceived entitlements (justice claims) in the escalation, negotiation and 
settlement of international and intrastate conflicts. See Daase/Humrich (2011) and Müller/Druckman (2014).
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in political realism, emphasizes the threat to peace emanating from the application of force, i.e., the 
destabilization of the existing order (understood on the one hand as a system of law, on the other as 
a balance of power). By contrast, a broader concept of peace, as it is understood by liberal or critical 
approaches, would be more interested in transformative aspects, including the further development 
of law or the enforcement of norms and values not founded on specific laws. Because both perspec-
tives are important for analyzing the relationship between coercion and peace, it does not make 
sense to make a commitment to either a broad or a narrow concept of peace. In general terms, when 
analyzing the consequences and the legitimacy of coercion, the research program will have to exam-
ine both the short-term and the long-term effects of coercion as well as its impact on both the level 
of physical violence and on the quality of peace in a broader sense. 
2.4 TOWARDS AN OPERATIONALIZATION OF COERCION
The concept of coercion, as defined above, constitutes an ideal type (given that freedom can never 
be entirely eliminated). In our empirical research, we will choose different ways of operationaliz-
ing and applying coercion – in line with the specific aims and questions of the individual research 
projects. Projects may, for instance, simply define the use of a specific instrument (say, the use of 
military force) as an exercise of coercion, without establishing empirical benchmarks that make this 
instrument “truly” coercive according to our definition. Other projects, however, might be interested 
in comparing different usages of the same instrument in coercive and non-coercive ways and, there-
fore, define such benchmarks (in the sense, for instance, that economic sanctions, in order to be 
considered coercive, have to affect a certain share of the coerced country’s overall trade or GDP). In 
other contexts, coercion may instead be defined by the perception of the coercer (is it meant to elimi-
nate the freedom of the other actor?) or of the coerced (is it perceived as such an attempt?). This list 
of options is certainly not exhaustive and will be expanded and improved when designing individual 
research projects.
3. overvIew of exIStIng reSearCh
All major discussions of the origins of political order identify coercion as its basic foundation. The 
creation of political order responds to chaos and violence, and it succeeds to the extent that it dis-
arms individuals and groups, subjects them to discipline, and forces them to coexist – more or less 
peacefully – according to some general rules. This is most easily seen in the form of the state as a 
leviathan which, through the exercise of absolute power, forces the individual to abandon the natural 
state and acknowledge law and justice.16 However, the image of the leviathan also reveals the am-
bivalent character of coercion. It is not only the fundamental basis of order, but also the abyss on the 
edge of which order stands. For when coercion is imposed outside a framework of law and reason, 
16 “Therefore before the Names of just and unjust can have Place, there must be some coercive Power, to compel Men 
equally to the Performance of their Covenants, by the Terror of some Punishment, greater than the Benefit they ex-
pect by the Breach of their Covenant, and to make good that Propriety, which by mutual Contract Men acquire, in Rec-
ompence of the universal Right they abandon: and such Power there is none before the Erection of a Commonwealth. 
[…] Therefore […] the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civil Power, sufficient to compel 
Men to keep them […].” (Hobbes 1750: 158).
10 PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT
the obligation of subjects to be true to the law is dissolved and resistance against the illegitimate 
order is justified.17
Also outside the framework of the state, coercion is studied as a decisive component of political 
order. Even though there is no central power of compulsion in the international system, there are var-
ious forms of more or less decentralized coercion. Examples include mediation in disputes between 
parties to a conflict by more or less robust peace missions (peacekeeping), the monitoring of the 
implementation of and compliance with international agreements (verification), the threat and im-
position of negative consequences in the name of peace and security, democracy and human rights 
(sanctions), the enforcement of “weak” international law (international jurisdiction), or the use of 
military force in order to enforce peace or respond to security threats (military interventions). At the 
same time, these examples demonstrate the potential threat to peace intrinsically present in coer-
cion. This becomes all the more clear when taking into account that coercion in the international sys-
tem is frequently not exercised by an overarching multilateral authority (such as the United Nations) 
but by individual states or alliances that, even if justifying the use of coercion in line with international 
norms, usually (also) pursue other purposes. Therefore, even more strongly than in the context of the 
national state, in the international system the question of the legitimacy and effectiveness of coer-
cion as an element of a peaceful global order arises.
3.1 THE NORMATIVE DEBATE
When it comes to normatively assessing coercion, there are two opposing views. The first position 
regards coercion principally as a violation of rights, and as problematic for this reason (Wertheimer 
1987). Any restriction of a person’s free will and limitation of freedom of choice violates individual 
rights and undermines the authenticity of behavior and the stability of social interactions. For this 
reason, many theories of peace and political order regard reduction of coercion, absence of coercion 
or even freedom from domination as the normative ideal (see above). But not only normative theories 
of peace, legitimacy and authority operate on the basis of this fundamental assumption – theories 
that are more strongly empirical and analytical do so as well. Governance approaches, for example, 
emphasize the legitimacy of models of control based on “soft” forms of control, such as deliberation 
and learning, and eschew coercion; theories of democracy treat the reduction in state coercion as an 
indicator of democratization; and development theories call for local negotiation of political interven-
tions in order to maximize internal ownership and minimize external coercion.
The second position regards coercion as normatively neutral or even as necessary for social and 
political orders to function and produce public goods. Coercion only becomes problematic when it 
is employed to achieve problematic ends (Zimmerman 2002; Sachs 2013).18 Empirically and analyt-
17 “Wherever law ends, tyranny begins […]; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and 
makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceas-
es in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed as any other man, who by force invades 
the right of another.” (Locke 1824 [1689]: 251 [§ 202]).
18   From this perspective, the key issue (and tension), then “is not between order and justice but between just and unjust 
coercive orders” (Nardin 2005: 262).
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ically, such approaches draw attention to problems that arise as a result of “too little” coercion, for 
instance when cooperation cannot be achieved because no coercion or no effective coercion exists 
(tragedy of the commons), agreed upon arrangements are not honored because there is no monitor-
ing, or models of order fail because rival groups cannot agree on their implementation. Against this 
background, Jane Mansbridge calls for abandoning resistance to coercion based on theoretical rea-
soning. Otherwise, in our efforts to achieve freedom we would fail to recognize the necessity of coer-
cion and would fail to see that our political orders would be less and less able to fulfill their purpose 
of providing public goods such as peace, security and wellbeing (Mansbridge 2015).
The research program Coercion and Peace aims at contributing to this debate by focusing on the 
ambivalent role of coercion in establishing and maintaining peace. However, it does this less through 
means of normative reasoning (although perspectives of legal theory and peace ethics will play a 
role) and more on the basis of empirical research into the relationship between coercion and peace. 
The potential of such a research program to generate innovative research depends less upon study-
ing some novel phenomenon or new theses, and much more on the systematic and comparative ex-
amination of one of the core concepts of political science in general, and peace and conflict research 
in particular. For, although coercion is indisputably such a core concept, in much of the mainstream 
debate it is still only the “other,” which serves as a counterfoil for the researcher’s own interests. Coer-
cion serves either as a negative (coercion as the opposite of peace) or as a positive counterfoil from 
which there can be deviations (coercion as a set of background conditions for successful peaceful 
resolution) but is hardly ever itself the subject of research. In addition, most of the time, only specific 
manifestations of coercion (e.g., military force) are studied, without analyzing them as elements of 
more complex configurations of coercion that may include non-violent and/or systemic forms.
At the same time, as we show below, research that is directly dedicated to the analysis of coer-
cion is strongly anchored in particular research fields, so that there is only a small amount of cross-
field or even interdisciplinary communication and research. The intention of PRIF’s new research 
program is to provide both: It is focused on the concept of coercion and brings the individual research 
strands together by means of an analytic approach, which investigates the factors influencing coer-
cion, its forms, consequences and legitimization in achieving and maintaining peace.
3.2 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
As we pointed out above, coercion is not a new phenomenon, but is studied in several research fields. 
Consequently, empirical findings on coercion will not be reviewed in terms of disciplinary orientations 
(law vs. social science vs. philosophical approaches), but in terms of these established research 
fields.
3.2.1 CompellenCe and deterrenCe
In International Relations, following the seminal study of Thomas Schelling (1966), the concept of 
coercion is often divided into two types: deterrence and compellence. Whereas deterrence involves 
forcing an actor not to do some particular thing (for example, to fire a nuclear weapon), compellence 
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induces an actor to do some specific thing (for instance, to withdraw from an occupied territory) 
(see Art/Greenhill 2018: 5–6). As already suggested by Schelling (1966), this distinction usually goes 
together with the assumption that it is easier to stop people from doing something (negative) than 
to force them to do something (positive) (Art/Greenhill 2018: 18). Nonetheless, qualifications have 
been added which specify that for effective deterrence just as much force must be applied as for 
successful compellence (Peterson 1986). However, if the different psychology of the two scenarios 
is kept in mind in the sense of prospect theory, it becomes apparent that with increasing prospects of 
losses, deterrence requires less coercive effort, i.e., it is easier, than compellence (Schaub 2004). To 
this should be added the insight that compellence strategies are more likely to lead to war, because 
they occur in an environment of political escalation. A key question that is at stake in this debate is 
whether preventive coercion in the sense of deterrence offers the smarter and more promising strat-
egy in dealing with emerging crises than corrective coercion in the sense of compellence (Stein 1992; 
Sagan 2013).
3.2.2 ComplIanCe and governanCe
Coercion is also a central category in the field of compliance research. For a long time, the goal was 
to show that coercion cannot explain the maintenance of international norms on its own. Whereas 
the enforcement school of thought emphasizes the role of sanctions in guaranteeing compliance 
with international norms (Downs et al. 1996), the management school assumes that in most cases 
international norms are respected because of their legitimacy (Franck 1990), and that failure to com-
ply with them is often the result of lack of capacity rather than lack of interest (Chayes/Chayes 1993; 
Mitchell 1993). In addition, the so-called adjudication school emphasizes procedural elements, for 
example legal instruments such as mediation and international courts, for promoting compliance 
with norms (Abbott et al. 2000). There is also discussion of the extent to which the implementation 
of norms depends upon more accessible processes for interpreting them at the international level 
(Wiener 2004, 2008).
However, convincing states to bind themselves to complying with international rules, whether it 
is a matter of democracy or human rights, is also a core topic of research. Research on socialization 
and the promotion of democracy has explicitly investigated which strategies promote the adoption 
of rules. Whereas initially the view was widely expressed that coercion in the form of “conditionality” 
(i.e., the threat of sanctions or the promise of reward) would explain adoption of rules (Schimmelfen-
nig/Sedelmeier 2004; Kelley 2004), in later debates the discussion was concerned with the view that 
(1) other mechanisms such as persuasion and teaching might lead to more extensive compliance 
with norms (see Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005). At the same time, it was cautioned that (2) coercion 
and conditionality are quite problematic for normative reasons, and the promotion of democracy and 
human rights should instead be carried out through dialogue (see Kurki 2013; Wolff et al. 2014). 
Against this background, coercion also plays an important role in governance research, even 
though governance is frequently – with normative connotations – regarded as a form of control 
which rejects coercion. However, the research field of “governance in areas of limited statehood” in 
particular has shown that the governance concept depends upon a functioning state’s coercive ap-
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paratus as a background condition (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2007). Consequently, a key question of this re-
search agenda was how to conceptualize governance in order to be able to apply it to areas of limited 
statehood, i.e., areas in which precisely this background condition is in question. This research has 
produced a number of interesting findings on functional equivalents of coercion, or in the terminology 
used there of the “shadow of hierarchy,” and the PRIF research program will be able to build on these 
findings (see Börzel 2008; Risse 2011).
3.2.3 CoerCIve dIplomaCy
The theory of coercive diplomacy as originally formulated by Alexander George (1991) understands 
non-violent coercion as an alternative to war (see also Art/Cronin 2003). The general idea is to re-
inforce political demands made of another government with a threat of punishment for non-com-
pliance. If the threat is credible and potent enough, it will persuade the adversary to comply with 
the demand. If successful, coercive diplomacy promises to secure a peaceful resolution of inter-
state disputes without the necessity of resorting to war. However, since the theory (and most of 
the subsequent empirical research) assumes pure rationality, full information and correct evaluation 
of both, the coercing and coerced actor, and largely ignores values, culture, tradition and psycho-
logical factors, the theory has neither exploited its explanatory nor prescriptive potential to the full 
extent (Lebow 2007: 223ff). There has been heated debate over the effectiveness of coercive diplo-
macy, especially with regard to economic sanctions. Applied as comprehensive trade embargoes, 
economic sanctions have rarely achieved their objectives as quantitative and qualitative analyses 
have revealed (Cortright/Lopez 2000; Hufbauer et al 1990; Hultman/Peksen 2017; Pape 1997). More 
targeted, so-called smart sanctions seem to yield better results, but doubts remain as to their causal 
effects on changed political behavior (Drezner 2011). The research on coercive diplomacy in general 
and economic sanctions in particular suffers from a number of problems, which are both conceptual 
and theoretical in nature. While research focuses on threats of punishment, in other words, negative 
sanctions, the promise of reward, or positive sanctions, has largely been overlooked (but see Wallen-
steen 2005). In addition, the concentration on a narrow concept of effectiveness in terms of changed 
behavior of the coerced actor seems to overly restrict the meaning and aims of sanctions. Thus a 
broader understanding of sanctions as tools of coercion could shed new light on sanctioning as a 
normative practice.
3.2.4 peaCe enforCement and mIlItary InterventIon
Research on military coercion focuses on different forms of intervention which partly overlap, such 
as great power interventions, asymmetrical warfare or interventions in civil wars. Relatively few em-
pirical studies concentrate on the particularly controversial issue of humanitarian military interven-
tion. Most studies on asymmetric wars and counter-insurgency are in agreement that, with the pas-
sage of time, military successes of the more powerful parties have become less frequent and that, 
since 1950, successes by the weaker side predominate (e.g., Arreguin-Toft 2001; Lyall/Wilson 2009; 
Mack 1975; Paul/Clarke/Grill 2010). In the case of civil wars, military interventions often drag out hos-
tilities, either through weapons deliveries or stationing of foreign soldiers. A more complex picture 
emerges when a distinction is made according to form, actors and alignment of the intervention (see, 
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for instance, Cunningham 2010; Regan 2002; Regan 2010). No other subgroup of military interven-
tions has been as intensively studied as the deployment of peacekeepers to civil wars. A substantial 
portion of quantitative studies credits peacekeepers with having prevented the outbreak of further 
civil wars (e.g., Fortna 2008; Walter 2002). However, in contrast to this, more recent studies see 
no such significant effect (e.g., Joshi/Quinn 2015; Walter 2015). Humanitarian military interventions 
overlap with both the broadly defined category of military interventions in civil wars as well as with 
the deployment of peacekeepers, without being identical to either of these case types. It is striking 
that there is only a small number of multi-case studies of success rates and factors determining the 
success of humanitarian military interventions (e.g., Krain 2005; Seybolt 2007; Wood/Kathman/Gent 
2012). Until now, reliable comparative studies on humanitarian military interventions that would study 
the effects of this type of international coercion on intrastate violence/peace have been lacking.
3.2.5 State repreSSIon, regIme StabIlIty and IntraState peaCe
In comparative research on political regimes and their transformation, coercion – as a rule associat-
ed with the state – plays a central role but is rarely addressed specifically (but see Tilly 1990). In the 
1990s, in line with the governance paradigm, bottom-up dynamics (“civil society”) and horizontal or 
“soft” forms of control (“good governance”) were at the center of interest. Coercion, taking the shape 
of political repression, was mainly discussed as the negative “other” that characterizes authoritarian 
regimes. This changed with the debates on state failure, the return of the authoritarian development 
state, comparative research on authoritarian resilience as well as on the conflict risk inherent to “un-
controlled” democratization processes and fragile states. Today, scholars, on the one hand, empha-
size that a state with coercive capacities is key to preventing civil wars, and building such a state has 
become a crucial, if problematic, task for international interventions aimed at promoting democracy 
and peace in post-conflict societies (see Brock et al. 2011; Fearon/Laitin 2004; Giustozzi 2011). On the 
other hand, research on authoritarian regimes has shifted away from a narrow focus on repression 
towards analyzing the interrelation between repression, as only one pillar of authoritarian stability, 
with other mechanisms that sustain authoritarian rule (see Art 2012; Gandhi/Przeworski 2007; Ger-
schewski 2013). Finally, the revolutions and civil wars provoked by authoritarian regimes (for exam-
ple, in the Arab world) as well as the global trend of increasing restrictions on civil society (“closing 
space”) have also drawn renewed attention to the dark side of coercion-based state authority (see 
Brownlee et al. 2015; Carothers/Brechenmacher 2014; Poppe/Wolff 2017). However, here too there is 
no comparative agenda – deriving from, for example, the concept of coercion – which systematically 
investigates the significance and ambivalence of coercion for the organization and transformation of 
political orders, internal conflicts and peace.
4. analytICal heurIStIC
In order to pull these largely independently existing research strands together and, as a result, to en-
able novel research questions and systematic comparative research, the research program will cast 
light on the relationship between coercion and peace in two central areas, coercion to peace and coer-
cion in peace. In the first case, the question is whether and under what conditions and with what risks 
peace can be imposed upon people. In the second case, research looks at the role that coercion plays 
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in maintaining or undermining a given – more or less – peaceful order. These two core questions can 
each be broken down into five guiding questions for research, which make it possible to examine the 
phenomenon in a systematic manner. These questions involve the factors leading to (successful) 
coercion, its forms, the consequences that coercion brings, the legitimization of coercion and alter-
natives to coercion (see Table 1).
Coercion to Peace Coercion in Peace
Co
nd
iti
on
s Under what conditions does coercion contrib-
ute to achieving peace?
Under what conditions does coercion serve to 
maintain peace?
Fo
rm
s
What forms and configurations of coercion 
contribute to the establishment of peace?
What forms and configurations of coercion 
contribute to the maintenance of peace?
Ef
fe
ct
s
What effects does the imposition of peace have 
(for example, on the quality and durability of 
peace, on the formation of resistance)?
What effects does a peace order based on coer-
cion have (for example, on the quality and dura-
bility of peace, on the formation of resistance)?
Le
gi
tim
at
io
n How – and how successfully – can coercion be 
justified as a means for establishing peace? To 
what extent does it seem legitimate to those af-
fected?
How – and how successfully – can coercion be 
justified as a means for maintaining peace? To 
what extent does it seem legitimate to those af-
fected?
A
lte
rn
at
iv
es What alternatives are there to imposing peace? 
How do these differ from coercion in form, legit-
imation and effect?
What alternatives are there to imposed mainte-
nance of peace? How do these differ from coer-
cion in form, legitimation and effect?
Table 1: Overarching questions
5. outlook: key lIneS of reSearCh
The aim of this PRIF Report is to outline the overall research agenda that will guide a significant part 
of the institute’s scholarly work in the upcoming years. In this final chapter, key research topics and 
lines of investigation are identified that will be tackled either by individual research departments (5.1) 
or as cross-cutting themes (5.2).
5.1 KEY RESEARCH TOPICS IN PRIF’S RESEARCH DEPARTMENTS
Research Department I “International Security” (RD I) deals with peace and conflict at the interstate 
level. It focuses on how states perceive and confront current and emerging security threats, develop 
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and implement military strategies, and perform in international organizations and institutional set-
tings. In particular, RD I investigates the impact of geopolitical, technological and normative change 
on the use of force, arms control and disarmament, as well as nuclear deterrence and non-prolifera-
tion. Consequently, in the context of the new research program, RD I will address two kinds of coer-
cion: military and non-military coercion in interstate relations. This distinction roughly corresponds to 
the basic differentiation between coercion to and coercion in peace presented in section 4: Non-mil-
itary coercion, like, for example, sanctions, is usually applied in situations of rising tensions before 
a war or after a war until the defeated has fulfilled all obligations; military coercion, in contrast, is 
usually relevant in times of war. But it has to be kept in mind that some military missions, such as 
intrusion into sovereign territory with drones, while coercive in nature, might not be considered an 
act of “war” in a strict sense – in the case of drones due to the unmanned nature of the system (see 
Sauer/Schörnig 2012; Schörnig 2013).19
Lacking central authority, international politics has been the realm of mutual, decentralized co-
ercion for centuries. States have tried to influence the fate and decisions of other states by limiting 
their adversaries’ choices either peacefully by diplomatic means or violently by war (Leng 1993). 
While the objective of influencing other states’ policies has remained stable, the means and aims 
of coercion have changed over time due to political, technological and normative transformations: 
The current shift in power from Western-liberal powers to emerging powers is having a significant 
impact on world order and will influence the instruments used to enforce this order. New technolo-
gies of coercion, such as new weapons systems, have changed the way in which states interact and 
communicate in order to compel each other to do or deter each other from doing specific things; non-
state actors apply strategies such as guerrilla or hybrid warfare and terrorism to coerce states into 
concessions, and states have adapted to that challenge by developing countermeasures to maintain 
escalation dominance; finally, normative developments have restricted the use of coercive means 
and forced states to justify their interference with other states’ internal affairs and the use or threat 
of force with reference to international norms and values.
Building on previous research on power politics, military strategy, and arms control, RD I will in-
vestigate how technological, political, and normative change has affected the coercive capacity of 
states and, ultimately, the consequences this has on national and international peace and security. 
Research Department II “International Institutions” (RD II) focuses on international institutions 
(organizations, regimes and conventions), and investigates their emergence, change over time, and 
effects for establishing and maintaining peace, both within states and internationally. Traditionally, 
international institutions are seen as having an important role in establishing and maintaining inter-
national peace and security without the need to rely on coercion in the process (Jervis 1982; Lipson 
1984; Wendt/Duvall 1989; Haftendorn et al. 1999; Lake 2001). They facilitate coordination and col-
laboration among states and provide the basis for credible cooperation on a voluntary basis even in 
situations of conflict, by stabilizing expectations and promising mutually beneficial results (Keohane 
19   In addition, in context of wars, coercion is not only of a military type, but can also include non-military forms (such as 
sanctions).
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1989; Buchanan/Keohane 2006). More recently, however, research has brought to light that interna-
tional institutions are increasingly also claiming the authority to make binding decisions and that 
such claims often meet with resistance. Research on the authority of international institutions (e.g., 
Barnett/Finnemore 2004) – whether institutional, delegated, moral, or capacity-related – has demon-
strated that this authority is often compromised, contested, and ambiguous, and can create dissent 
or even open resistance (Avant et al. 2010; Zürn et al. 2012; Daase/Deitelhoff 2015). Little is known, 
however, about (1) the means of coercion that international institutions possess for enforcing their 
claims to authority once they become contested; and (2) about the consequences the actual use of 
coercive means has for peace and cooperation. 
RD II will focus on these two issues in exploring the coercive side of international institutions and 
its consequences for peace and cooperation: how coercion is institutionalized internationally (i.e., 
questions of institutional design); and what consequences the use of coercive means by international 
institutions has for peace and cooperation. While these means exist and are applied to ensure coop-
eration and peace, they have the potential to create and exacerbate conflict. Members of internation-
al institutions as well as those affected by their policies may hold different views about the justifiable 
degree of coercion an institution ought to possess, as well as where and how coercion is justifiably 
applied. This is particularly true in cases where international organizations use force or the threat of 
force to establish or restore international order (e.g., through military intervention or peace opera-
tions) but also in situations where more subtle forms of non-violent coercion are used to enforce in-
ternational norms, such as through economic sanctions (Drezner 2011) or international tribunals and 
courts. Hence resistance to international authority may come not only from an organization’s mem-
ber states, but also from non-member states and non-state actors who are more or less affected by 
the organization’s policies, for example, groups in societies subject to liberal peacebuilding (Pouligny 
2006; Zimmermann 2017) or transnational environmental groups whose objective to protect biodiver-
sity conflicts with WTO trade regulations (Rosendal 2001; Nazarea et al. 2013). In situations like this 
where international institutions seek to assert themselves vis-à-vis resistance, the precariousness 
of institutional authority and the Janus face of coercion become evident: On the one hand, coercion 
may help to guarantee compliance with and the stability of established norms and rules externally, 
and may thus help establish peace. On the other hand, it may undermine internal willingness to obey 
norms and follow rules voluntarily, and thus the sustainability of peace.
The central research questions that RD II will pursue through a number of related projects result 
from these two issues: the apparent limits of institutional design when it comes to devising coercive 
means by international institutions; and the ambivalence of the use of those coercive means. What 
are the coercive designs and the means international institutions have at their disposal and how do 
they vary over time and across issue areas? What is the effect of coercion, latent and manifest, on 
the authority of international institutions? Under what conditions does coercion contribute to or un-
dermine peace, both within states and internationally? What alternatives to coercion do international 
institutions offer in order to realize their promise of resolving conflicts and establishing peace and 
security?
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Research Department III “Transnational Actors” (RD III) focuses on the transnational dimension of 
peace and conflict. It aims at exploring coercion in the allegedly non-coercive sphere of transnational 
politics and its effects on international and domestic peace and conflict dynamics. This is done by 
analyzing transnational non-state actors both as coerced and coercing actors.
Traditionally, in IR, the transnational sphere is depicted as “free” of coercion. Coercion as well as 
hierarchical regulation are attributed to states. Indeed, while the regulation of various policy fields 
has been moved to the supranational and transnational sphere and its legitimation has also become 
a subject of transnational processes, institutionalized means of coercion have remained, to a large 
degree, in the hands of states (Leibfried/Zürn 2006; Genschel/Zangl 2008). Transnational politics, 
broadly understood as cross-border interactions of state and non-state actors or, in some instances, 
among non-state actors, in contrast, have become virtually synonymous with the concept of global 
governance. The latter refers to the setting and implementation of norms and rules and the horizontal 
production of collective goods by a variety of actors, including states and non-state actors, in differ-
ent forms of co-regulation or private self-regulation (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Dingwerth/Pattberg 
2006; Avant et al. 2010). 
Global governance is often portrayed as the opposite of coercion: Legitimacy is generated by 
voluntary participation in governance processes and by voluntary agreements (Liese/Beisheim 2011) 
as well as by the effectiveness and functionality of outcomes (Dingwerth 2007; Wolf 2014). Coercive 
strategies are deliberately avoided and, instead, non-state actors are invited to voluntarily contribute 
to regulation (as illustrated in various public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives) 
because of their unique resources (for example, expertise or financial power, Hall/Biersteker 2002, 
203–222; Wolf 2008). 
This impression that coercion does not seem to play a role in transnational politics is rather 
misleading because it disregards the manifold materializations of coercion which RD III aims to in-
vestigate. This includes the use of coercion both against and by transnational non-state actors. The 
former is most obvious in the case of armed non-state actors, such as rebels and terrorist groups, or 
criminal non-state actors, such as pirates, the mafia, and human traffickers, against which coercive 
measures are regularly applied (Jakobi/Wolf 2013). A particular issue in this regard concerns the 
question of how coercion affects processes of radicalization of non-state actors, in other words pro-
cesses through which the individual or collective voicing of disagreement turns into disruptive pro-
test or political violence. Currently this question is being discussed primarily in the context of Islamist 
terrorism (see, for instance, Biene et al. 2016) but it also applies to other forms of political resistance. 
Transnational governance also relies on more covert forms of coercion, for instance when “volun-
tary” commitments of multinational corporations are backed or even driven by the implicit threat that 
states will resort to coercive regulation if corporations fail to solve the problems on their own (Zerk 
2006; Vogel 2008). With a view to coercion as exercised by transnational non-state actors, research 
will investigate how such non-state coercion is related to peace and conflict dynamics. Again, the 
exercise of coercion by armed groups is the most obvious example; but relevant topics also include 
the delegation of state coercion to non-state actors such as private security actors (Avant 2005; Dei-
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telhoff/Geis 2010) or the use of disruptive tactics by transnational civil society actors (Coni-Zimmer 
2012; Daphi 2017a, b; Risse/Sikkink 1999).
Research Department IV “Intrastate Conflict” (RD IV) deals with peace and conflict at the intrastate 
level. Its particular concern is with the relationship between the organization and transformation of 
political rule, on the one hand, and the escalation or de-escalation of intrastate conflict, on the oth-
er. In analyzing this relationship, research in RD IV systematically accounts for the social, economic 
and international embeddedness of political rule and intrastate peace. This includes investigating 
the ways in which “external” actors and forces intervene in and shape societal conflicts and political 
change. In the context of the research program Coercion and Peace, RD IV will address two key over-
all types of coercion: coercion at the intrastate level (internal coercion) and coercion as exercised by 
external actors or constituted by cross-border relations (external coercion). Both internal and exter-
nal forms of coercion as well as their interplay will be analyzed with a view to understanding their 
ambivalent role in keeping the maintenance or undermining of intrastate peace (coercion in peace), 
on the one hand, and in the establishment and consolidation of intrastate peace (coercion to peace), 
on the other. In line with the overall aim of this research program, the main question concerning the 
former dimension is whether and in what way different types of (external and internal) coercion that 
sustain a given political order succeed, and how this affects the maintenance and sustainability of in-
trastate peace. In dealing with the latter, research will assess whether and in what way different types 
of (external and internal) coercion that aim at reducing violent intrastate conflict succeed, and how 
this affects the establishment of durable intrastate peace.
Coercion is a constant theme in research on the external and internal dimensions of peace, vio-
lent conflict and political order at the intrastate level – even though existing studies mostly do not ex-
plicitly focus on the term coercion. Political repression – that is violence-based coercion as exercised 
by states – constitutes a key factor when it comes to explaining the stability of authoritarian regimes 
(Gerschewski 2013), the (violent) escalation of contentious politics (Tilly/Tarrow 2007) or the risks 
for peace associated with regime change (Hegre et al. 2001). In terms of international influence upon 
political order and intrastate peace, the use of coercion by military means is an important subject in 
studies of democracy promotion (Beetham 2009; Downes/Monten 2013; Wolff 2015) as well as of so-
called humanitarian interventions and the responsibility to protect (see Bellamy/Dunne 2016; Brock/
Deitelhoff 2012; Holzgrefe/Keohane 2003; Jahn 2012). With a view to so-called failed or fragile states 
and related international activities of state- and peacebuilding, scholars struggle with the question of 
whether and how to establish a legitimate centralized authority with coercive power, which may be 
required for a successful transition to peace, but which is itself a difficult and violence-prone process 
(see, e.g., Giustozzi 2011). A further field of study is research on coercion on the fringes or beyond 
the state that looks at death squads, vigilantes or armed revolutionary organizations, traditional lead-
ers, religious authorities, or even large corporations; here, studies analyze the interplay of state- and 
society-based coercion in the establishment of sociopolitical orders with varying consequences for 
intrastate peace (see, e.g., Kreuzer 2012, 2017) 
The focus of existing research on repression, non-state violence, armed resistance and military 
international intervention implies that the issue of coercion is mostly addressed in terms of an ac-
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tor-centered, physical violence-based type of coercion. In the context of the new research program, 
by contrast, RD IV will systematically include non-violent forms of coercion that are exercised by ac-
tors (whether these are states, non-state groups or external actors) as well as structural forms of co-
ercion that are systemic features of intrastate or transnational order and not necessarily “exercised” 
by any specific actor. Whereas existing research treats such (non-violent and non-actor-centered) 
features of rule (Herrschaft) as categorically different from the actual use of physical violence by 
identifiable actors, the analytical focus on coercion enables us to investigate their common coercive 
logic and to study varying configurations of coercive mechanisms. Research in projects RD IV will, 
therefore, analyze the interplay of violent and non-violent, actor-centered and systemic, external and 
internal forms of coercion in the establishment, maintenance and undermining of intrastate peace.
Research department V “Glocal Junctions” (RD V) aims at unpacking the global connectedness of 
peace and conflict as studied from the point of view of situated practices. It focuses on scrutinizing 
the complexity of which diverse local life-worlds form part and interact within the global entangle-
ments of political conflicts and the different forms of their regulation. The “local” is understood as 
a relational category that only makes sense within a broader picture of contingent and often messy 
connections which cut across worldly spaces. In line with the concept of “glocalization” (Robertson 
1995; Swyngedouw 1997; Soja 2000), the global and the local are seen as mutually constitutive con-
structions and generally contingent analytical categories: Trans-local junctions permeate the alleged-
ly “micro” phenomena. In this vein, the “glocal” perspective emphasizes that globalization produces 
fragmented multi-scale realities that are often rife with conflict. Global flows of ideas, information, 
commodities, knowledge regimes, conceptions of the world or concrete models of social organiza-
tion and normative political order generate “disjunctures” (Appadurai 1990, 2005) and/or “productive 
friction” (Tsing 2004) that are sources of new meaning and power arrangements in the cultural econ-
omy of the world. Glocal interconnections, in this respect, entail contestations and translations into 
different local, regional, and global social situations. The aim of RD V is to explore concrete practices 
in order to disaggregate the very “heterogeneous realities that enter into the fabrication of” (Latour 
2005: 142) the glocal. In other words, the level of analysis is concrete situations, not because the lo-
cal is of interest, but because processes of social formation can only be investigated at the level of 
concrete interaction.
With this approach, RD V complements PRIF’s multi-dimensional approach to studying conflict 
and peace dynamics in a twofold way: firstly, by exploring the practices of political actors below the 
state level in relation to conflict lines and peace from an observation-based perspective founded on 
their glocal situatedness; and, secondly, by positioning this research on “the local” and following its 
implications in the larger context of intrastate and global interrelationships. Apart from informing 
research projects of the department, this conceptualization of peace and conflict dynamics as a 
“glocal” social practice also means that collaboration across PRIF’s organizational units will be of 
eminent concern.
Against this background, the research department approaches the question of how coercion and 
peace interrelate by focusing on two particular aspects: firstly, the multiplicity of forms of coercion 
that affect and interact in concrete localities which are usually marked by the intersection of a great 
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variety of governance and knowledge regimes; and, secondly a focus on the interactions and dynam-
ics between those addressed by coercion and the various institutions, structures or centers from 
which coercion is assumed to or does indeed emanate. The analytical starting point is hence not a 
particular set of actors who are either affected by or the sources of coercion, but instead the social 
sites in which a multiplicity of coercive effects manifest themselves, and how different actors per-
ceive, relate to, embrace, transform, or seek to resist them. Concretely, this translates into two broad 
research areas in which RD V will investigate the forms and the effects of coercion: (1) In order to 
contribute to investigating different forms of coercion, research will analyze coercion from the per-
spective of the co-production of hegemonial forms of legitimizing coercion; (2) in order to explore the 
(local) effects of coercion, RD V will investigate the impact of coercion on “local” power arenas.
5.2 CROSS-CUTTING RESEARCH TOPICS
There are a number of topics that are of interest for several research departments. Researchers from 
different departments will work together to examine these cross-cutting topics jointly. They will en-
gage in a dialogue about what their individual projects imply for these cross-cutting topics and col-
laborate in joint projects which will further explore these issues. Although this certainly represents a 
moving target, four such research topics have been identified so far.
A first key question concerns the historical development of coercive tools and practices. All re-
search departments explore different forms of coercion and different ways in which coercion is le-
gitimated in their respective areas of interest. The significance and legitimation of different forms of 
coercion, however, change over time. This holds for military means of coercion or coercive diplomacy 
(RD I) as well as for the instruments of coercion institutionalized in international organizations (RD II), 
applied against or by transnational actors (RD III) or within and against societies and groups (RDs IV 
and V). The historical evolution of coercive practices has hardly been explored so far: Why do we see 
different tools and practices of coercion at work in global politics? If we understand coercion as both 
a set of norm-based practices and a feature of organizational design, the emergence, diffusion, and 
evolution of these norms, practices, and organizational forms constitute key explananda. 
A second cross-cutting theme relates to the role of coercion in international peace interventions. 
This topic brings together two key issues that are dealt with in several research departments: the 
enforcement of peace from the outside (which is dealt with in research departments I, II and IV) and 
international peacebuilding (which is a key topic in RD II, IV and V). Here, the common theme is the 
role of coercion as applied by external actors in the context of international peace interventions and 
its effects on intrastate peace. While, in the case of so-called humanitarian military interventions, co-
ercion is usually seen as predominant, it is generally regarded as mostly marginal and fundamentally 
problematic in the context of peacebuilding. Yet, military interventions are usually accompanied by 
non-coercive types of external intervention, and their actual coercive capacity is frequently relative-
ly low, while peacebuilding missions are often far from non-coercive. At the same time, preliminary 
empirical evidence suggests that coercion has ambivalent effects on peace in both cases – but we 
know little about the conditions that shape these ambivalent effects or whether these are similar in 
coercion-to-peace and in coercion-in-peace contexts.
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Third, research across the different departments will contribute to shedding light on new forms of 
coercion and their impact on order. For a long time, state actors had only fairly limited options for co-
ercing other states into submission. Often options boiled down to the choice between either engag-
ing in full military conflict or settling for economic sanctions with only limited chances of success. 
However, with classic interstate war in decline we have seen an increasing differentiation of the spec-
trum of coercive instruments or forms of coercion more recently, including clandestine operations 
with Special Operation Forces (SOF), direct and indirect support of insurgents and opposing forces, 
drone strikes and information operations (Naylor 2015; Bergen/Rothenberg 2015). While many of 
these “new” instruments are in fact not so new, the increasing need to find scalable instruments 
paired with advances in technology (especially modern information technology) has opened up the 
spectrum of tools, and has made these instruments more attractive not only for great powers but for 
smaller states and even non-state actors as well. This topic constitutes a core issue that is dealt with 
in RD I, but the general question of whether and how new technologies change the face and the con-
sequences of coercion is of relevance at all levels: from the international to the local.
A final topic of interest to research across the research departments is the effects of and alterna-
tives to coercion in institutions. While coercion may contribute to peace, it may also undermine norms 
and institutions by creating resistance among those who are subjected to coercive measures. This 
concerns, for example, the reaction of the coerced to new forms of warfare (RD I), of member states 
or transnational actors subjected to coercion by international organizations (RDs II and III), or of do-
mestic actors and groups subject to internal and external coercion (RDs IV and V). Coercive institu-
tions that provoke such resistance can become destabilized or even disintegrate. The question thus 
arises whether and under what conditions the disintegration of coercive institutions may actually be 
a blessing. At times, the coexistence of separate actors or groups may be a more successful strategy 
for achieving peace than the attempt to force actors together in a common institutional framework.
5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research programs are like living organisms. They evolve with the discussions and investigations 
they give rise to. This is particularly true for a research program – such as the one presented in this 
report – that aims at guiding the work of an entire research institute for at least five years. The re-
search agenda outlined in the preceding sections, therefore, is not carved in stone.
With this overall caveat in mind, the present document has put forward overarching questions, 
crucial conceptual clarifications, and important analytical distinctions that will help us analyze the 
role of coercion in the creation, maintenance and undermining of peace. In addition, based on a re-
view of existing scholarship, the report has identified research gaps and promising topics and lines 
of research that will guide the development of individual research projects. We are convinced that, 
taken together, these conceptual, theoretical, and empirical thoughts lay the foundation for a collab-
orative research effort that will significantly further our understanding of the ambivalent relationship 
between coercion and peace – with the ultimate goal of contributing to the establishment of peaceful 
orders that are as non-coercive as possible.
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